Edition:
November 13, 2009
Public Notices - DBA Info • CONTACT
US: News Department • Display
Advertising • Classified
Advertising
|
||
Missions in Viet Nam generally fell into three categories: close air support of friendly forces in South Viet Nam, ground attack in North Viet Nam/Laos and combat air patrol to intercept enemy fighters. Each required different ordinance and different delivery tactics, according to Dudley.
The weapon release altitude over North Viet Nam was 4,500 ft. to preclude the attack from penetrating the effective range of small arms fire (light machine guns), unless a special mission was ordered. Weapons were 750- or 500-lb. bombs, 2.75-in. rockets and Cluster Bomb Units (CBU), depending on the target.
Weapon release altitude for friendly support ranged from 100 ft. to 50 ft., depending on terrain, and usually drew some small arms fire. Weapons were high drag bombs and napalm. “Both were very accurate and effective but required careful delivery to avoid injuring friendly forces,” says Dudley.
Da Nang had a 24-hour commitment for ground alert with a five-minute launch window. The 366 Tactical Fighter Wing call-sign was “Gunfighter,” so named because it was the first F-4 Wing to be equipped with the 23 mm Gatling gun attached to the centerline station. The first flight was Gunfighter 1 and 2. Each was normally configured for strikes in North Viet Nam/Laos. The second flight was Gunfighter 3 and 4. It primarily was used for close air support. The third flight was Gunfighter 5 and 6, configured for air defense. Alert duty was rotated through the three squadrons stationed there.
“It was from alert that I flew my most memorable mission,” says Dudley. “My squadron had alert duty for the week and, on September 1, 1968, I was assigned to fly Gunfighter 4. Gunfighter 3 had six 500-lb. high drag bombs and a gun. I had four 700-lb. napalm tanks and a gun. We attended the alert force briefing on weather and intelligence and were advised the weather would be deteriorating due to an approaching typhoon, predicted to make landfall well to the north of us.”
Intelligence told them there was very little enemy activity in South Viet Nam, so they anticipated a quiet day; however, they were told of a shoot-down of Carter 01, the lead F-4 of Carter flight in the vicinity of Dong Hoi, North Viet Nam. Gunfighter 1 and 2 were told to expect a launch to support the rescue operation underway.
With the briefing done, Dudley’s crew proceeded to the alert area to relieve the outgoing crew from alert duty. He and his “backseater” pre-flighted their F-4 and set it up for instant start and taxi. They then went to the alert trailer to await a long day and night. As expected, Gunfighter 1 and 2 launched and returned within two hours, having flown to Dong Hoi and expending their ordinance.
“We met them when they returned to the revetments to find out what success the rescue mission was having,” says Dudley. “They reported that Carter 01 Bravo (the downed F-4 backseater) was talking on his emergency radio and was okay but, as was often the case, North Viet Nam soldiers had set up a flack trap of Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) surrounding his position. There was no contact with Carter 01 Alpha (the pilot).”
According to Dudley, the crew had dropped its bombs with little success because the high release point demanded a large margin of error. “No reason to drop a bomb that killed your own man,” he explains.
The mission
As Dudley’s detailed description progresses, the drama of the operation is downplayed in favor of facts; nevertheless, it isn’t difficult to imagine the adrenaline that flowed on that late summer day in 1968. The account continues in Dudley’s own words.
“The initial rescue effort was run by Misty 1, a Forward Air Controller (FAC), flying an F-100 aircraft. As Gunfighter 1 and 2 departed the rescue area, they heard Sandy 1, 2 and 3 check in on the radio; Sandy 1 relieved Misty 1 as on-scene commander.
“Sandy flight flew low-speed piston driven A-1 aircraft that could carry a large load of ordinance. Their mission was to escort Jolly Green rescue helicopters to the target area and silence the guns. Unfortunately the slow speed made them sitting ducks for the heavy AAA. Sandy 2 and 3 made several passes and were damaged by the guns to the point they had to limp home.
“The lead Jolly Green attempted to start a rescue pass but was driven off by heavy fire. Sandy 1 then pressed the attack and was damaged severely. With his aircraft on fire and his radios disabled, the Sandy 1 pilot headed toward the Jolly Green helicopters that were holding in a safe area. When he arrived, he activated his ejection seat but it, too, had been disabled by the AAA. Fortunately, the fire went out and he was able to make a crash landing at Nakom Phanom Air Base in Thailand.
“Of course, we knew nothing of what was going on except that the effort was unsuccessful to this point. About 3 p.m. we received the order for Gunfighters 3 and 4 to launch. Once an engine was started and we were taxiing, my back-seat guy contacted the command post and we were instructed to pick up a heading of 340 degrees after takeoff and contact Hillsboro. Hillsboro was the call sign for an Airborne Command, Control and Communication aircraft with operational control of southern North Viet Nam.
“This came as a surprise because Gunfighter 3 and 4 never went to North Viet Nam. Hillsboro sent us to the frequency of the on-scene commander of the rescue operation who was now Misty 3.
“We were above a cloud deck and flying at about 15,000 ft. Misty 3 said that the target was a six- or seven-gun AAA site that partially ringed the downed pilot. He said the base of the overcast was about 3,500 ft. and we would have to let down over the sea and meet him over Dong Hoi. Flying under the overcast was particularly dangerous because the background highlighted your aircraft.
“We followed his instructions and he led us to the target while he described the area. He asked who had the napalm and we indicated I was the one. He said he only wanted the napalm because the AAA was too close to Carter 02 Bravo. He said when we reached the target he would mark it with a white phosphorus rocket, which was a marker that could not be extinguished. It produced huge volumes of persistent white smoke that could be seen at long distances.
“He said my best attack heading would be about 270 degrees and he would put the smoke in the middle of the AAA site. He was going to make his marking pass from south to north. With his heading and mine, it should produce an attack path that would not overfly the downed pilot. I watched his rocket pass and saw it impact the ground but no smoke.
“I had already rolled in with a 20-degree dive angle and then the smoke billowed up. I maneuvered to put my sight on the target and every gun in the area opened up. I have never seen gunfire so intense. At about 10 seconds to release I heard a panicked voice yell, ‘Gunfighter, go dry, go dry, go dry.’
“I aborted the pass with a hard pull up toward the left and immediately reversed to the right. Misty 3 said, ‘You won’t believe this but Carter 02 said the smoke just drifted over his head.” Carter 02 had become disoriented and had been calling out his position incorrectly. Misty 3 got the problem worked out and went back in for another marking pass. I repositioned my aircraft for the same heading as before.
“This was not a good thing to do but just about the only option available to me. If I were hit on this heading, I could make it to where the Jolly Green helicopters were holding only six miles to the west. The other direction would take 10 minutes to reach the sea and was over populated country.
“I started down again, told Misty I was on final, and he cleared me to drop. Again, the firing was intense but I managed to get off two napalm tanks on target. I called off and said I had two more tanks. Misty asked for a drop of one tank just north of the fires that were now burning and I did. There was hardly any AAA fire as I made the pass. Misty asked for the last tank just north of the previous drop and I complied. I saw no AAA fire. I told Misty that I had a 20 mm cannon if he needed it and he said not at this point. I spotted Gunfighter 3 and Misty 3 flying about 500 ft. apart and I joined with them about 500 ft. away.
“The lead Jolly Green helicopters went for the pickup and saw no AAA but did receive some small arms fire. They picked up Carter 02 Bravo and took him to Nakom Phanom. Misty 3’s parting remark was ‘Let’s get the hell out of here before we have to do it all over again.’ We didn’t have to be asked twice. We had all just spent the better part of an hour flying around in an extremely dangerous area and none of us had any damage. We were very, very, lucky.” Dudley later was awarded a Silver Star for this mission.
He finished his tour in Viet Nam in April 1969 and was ordered to the Space and Missile Systems Organization in El Segundo, California, where he became a project officer for advanced planning for the Space Shuttle and Global Positioning System. He was in charge of several other high-level assigments before his retirement from the Air Force in August 1981.
Silver Star
The citation that accompanied the Silver Star given to Dudley Thompson for the above mission states:
“Major John D. Thompson distinguished himself by gallantry in connection with military operations against an opposing armed force near Dong Hoi, North Viet Nam, on 1 September, 1968. On that date, Major Thompson flew his F-4D aircraft against anti-aircraft sites that had delayed a rescue operation for more than four hours by damaging and driving away the rescue aircraft. With complete disregard for his personal safety, Major Thompson repeatedly attacked the anti-aircraft batteries until they were silenced, allowing the rescue aircraft to successfully complete the pickup of the downed crew member. By his gallantry and devotion to duty, Major Thompson has reflected great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force."
|
|
